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1 Is a future Sino-American war probable or not? If it began, would it likely be started by
China as a rising power, or by America as a declining hegemon?
2 Many theorists of power transitions have seen the twentieth century’s world wars as
conflicts  started  by  Germany  seeking  to  replace  Britain  as  a  world  hegemon.
Contemporary application of that paradigm suggests that America, while still strong,
might muster resources to resist China’s rising power. Steve Chan argues,  however,
that this version of power-transition theory is inaccurate as a description of the past
and self-fulfilling as a prophesy of war. He likens the future Sino- American power shift
to smoother transitions, such as that from Britain to the US.
3 Although “officials and scholars construct realities (...) the U.K. chose to appease the
U.S.  and oppose Germany.” Chan suggests Britain’s motives were not cultural:  “The
argument for [Anglo-American] affinity will hardly suffice to explain London’s decision
to recruit Japan as a junior partner in the Asia Pacific during the late 1800s (...)” (p. 4).
He claims that Germany’s main fears in the 1910s and 1930s were of a rising Russia, and
that Berlin’s efforts to keep London (and then Washington) neutral failed when smaller
allies’ interests in war trumped the interests of larger powers in peace. Tails wag dogs
before major conflicts.
4 Chan suggests that rising states are rational enough not to go to war merely because of
past  humiliations  or  current  regime-type  differences.  Instead,  they  become  violent
when they expect the result of war may be a net gain for them. “Wars happen because
there are discrepancies between states’ power shares and their benefit shares” among
either newcomers or hegemons. Danger arises when national leaders believe they do
not receive a “‘fair’ share of benefits in proportion to their power” (p. 75). For example,
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if a dissatisfied state has prospered from exports (as China has, at least until 2009), a
keen sense of past insults may shape rhetoric without creating violence.
5 Chan predicts that a Sino-American power transition “is unlikely to materialize in the
next  three  or  so  decades  at  the  earliest,  if  at  all”  (p.  9).  Taiwan,  if  it  declared
independence, could threaten this peace. But Chan expects (and joins this reviewer in
hoping) that American policy can avoid a war by continuing to assure both Beijing and
Taipei that the US will not defend such a declaration.
6 To make his critique, Chan parses both logical categories and empirical evidence. While
commending  Chan’s  variety  of  styles  of  argumentation,  this  reviewer  prefers  the
specific histories to the incorporeal logics. It is possible to object to some of the ways
the book mixes them. For example, Chan notes that most power-transition theorists in
Germany before  either  world  war  saw the  US as  a  non-central  contender  in  world
politics because of Berlin’s overly exclusive attention to the European continent. But it
might be simpler to say that Berlin underestimated the reactions of both London and
Washington and overestimated Germany’s power. Greater immunity to the lure of the
abstract  could  lead a  writer  to  express  more direct  hope that  Beijing does  not  act
externally until its power is enough for peaceful Chinese success.
7 To take another example,  it  is  hard to estimate the truth of a sentence such as “A
severe sense of insecurity, rather than overconfidence, was the impetus behind Japan’s
military  planning [before  Pearl  Harbor]”  (p.  56).  Insecurity  and overconfidence  are
both documentable as factors in this mistake. Social scientists, including many whom
Chan rightly criticises, tend to like the kind of monocausal explanation that could have
been avoided here.
8 Chan  organises  a  convincingly  full  panoply  of  historical  similes  and  theorised
causations (including several versions of realism, institutionalism, and constructivism).
To make a long story short, he concludes as an optimist. Big wars can occur when rising
powers  underestimate  extended  deterrence  by  hegemons  that  do  not  make  their
interests clear. But Chan does not think this will happen any time soon in the Sino-
American case, where both major powers are nuclear, and where the most relevant
deterrence is of an attack on Taiwan, presuming the island does not legally renounce
its option to be part of China.
9 The danger of  Sino-American war would come from US indecision over whether to
deter a conflict if it could, or to make concessions if it could not. Chan says the PRC’s
neighbours, including Taiwan, are more likely to engage China’s prosperity than resist
it. He argues that if China receives adequate net benefits from its overall relations with
America,  there  will  be  peace.  He  guesses  that  “current  trends  favour  an  eventual
settlement of Taiwan’s status” (p. 119). Severe economic depression, more nationalist
definitions  of  “benefit”  among  Beijing  leaders,  and/or  a  resurgence  of  Taiwanese
nationalism  might  suggest  less  optimism—but  Chan  suggests  that  politicians  can
continue to avert a war.
10 This  reviewer  guesses  Chan  is  right,  even  though  some  of  his  interpretations  are
expressed  in  unnecessarily  complex  forms.  He  claims,  “For  a  policy  of  pivotal
deterrence to be credible, Taipei must be made to believe that Washington does not
really  intend  to  abandon  it  should  it  declare  formal  independence”  (p.  101).  This
sentence  depends  on  an  involuted  discussion  of  differences  between  “pivotal”  and
“extended”  deterrence,  but  that  framework  omits  consideration  of  factors  such  as
American naval capabilities or internal politics in Taiwan or the PRC—and after Chan
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introduces  such  factors,  the  discourse  becomes  convincing.  Some  theory  is  always
needed before empirical data are gathered, but Chan is all too faithful to contemporary
political science on the unusual occasions when he puts deduction prior to induction
without noting the iterative feedback between them.
11 Important prospective readers of this book are in China. Some, apparently including
the Peking University  Dean Wang Jisi,  would believe Chan’s  opinion that  no power
transition  may  take  place  soon.  Their  foreign  policy  is  thus  careful.  But  the  most
important readers of the book are American, if they see Chan’s evidence that declining
hegemons (often spurred to war by much smaller allies) have made crucial decisions
that led to world wars.
12 A power transition point is evidenced if one nation’s power surpasses that of another.
Yet  there  are  big  problems  with  criteria  such  as  a  “composite  index  of  national
capability,” which has been used by researchers in the Correlates of War Project, and
also with criteria developed by the CIA and others. Chinese social scientists such as
Tsinghua Professor Yan Xuetong have been avid surveyors of national power, and Yan
includes  a  subjective  factor:  the  degree  of  will  to  use  objective  capabilities.  “Soft”
cultural power has also been subject to surveys: numbers of tourists or foreign students
or movies. Dangers of unnecessary tragic war lurk in the wide grey-area ranges (not
points) in which asymmetric conflict is possible and the crossover of effective power is
uncertain.
13 A problem of power-transition theory, which Chan mentions but does not stress, is that
power  is  meaningless  when  separated  from  the  goals  for  which  it  is  exerted.  The
current global “superpower” has not been all that super in places such as Somalia, or in
serving its own interests in the Middle East. Chan’s criticisms of power transition are
cogent,  and he might  have extended them by stressing that  it  is  hard to  interpret
measures of power abstracted from its purposes.
14 Critiques  of  this  critique  are  possible,  therefore.  But  Chan  has  written  a  carefully
circumspect book about a global issue of the utmost importance. This book is like a
crash  course  in  both  international  relations  theory  and  Sino-American  security
relations. It is highly recommended to anybody who is interested in either China or
peace.
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